Industry
Industrial
Author

Rachel Goodman
Partner
What We Found
The opportunity was real. The market was there. But nearly everything about the execution was wrong.
They were selling to the wrong customers. In North America, Greythorne's primary customers were Tier 1 aerospace suppliers who valued reliability and were willing to pay a premium. In Europe, they were targeting Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers who were price-sensitive and viewed Greythorne as an unknown brand with no local track record. They were losing deals to local competitors who were 15-20% cheaper.
They'd misread the distribution model. In North America, Greythorne sold direct. In Europe, the market was organized around technical distributors who held relationships with the OEMs and provided localized support. Greythorne's direct sales approach was failing because they had no established relationships and couldn't provide the same level of local service.
Their pricing was wrong. They'd priced based on their North American cost structure plus a margin for complexity. But European competitors had lower labor costs and were pricing aggressively to defend share. Greythorne was 30% more expensive without a clear value justification.
What We Did
We rebuilt the entry strategy from scratch:
Shifted to Tier 1 targets exclusively. We identified twelve Tier 1 aerospace suppliers in Europe who had the same profile as Greythorne's best North American customers—quality-focused, risk-averse, willing to pay for reliability. We built a targeted account-based approach focused on those twelve companies.
Partnered with established distributors. Instead of competing with the distribution channel, we worked with it. We signed exclusive agreements with three technical distributors who already had relationships with our target customers. They handled local logistics and support. Greythorne provided the product and technical expertise.
Repriced based on value, not cost. We repositioned around the total cost of ownership—emphasizing that Greythorne's components had longer service life and lower failure rates, which reduced maintenance costs and downtime. The premium was justified by lower lifetime costs, not just quality.
The Result
Eighteen months after the pivot:
European revenue reached $14.3M (vs. original $12M target)
Greythorne became the primary supplier for six of the twelve target accounts
Monthly burn reduced from $180K to break-even
Gross margin in Europe matched North American margins at 42%
The European business is now one of Greythorne's fastest-growing segments and leadership is exploring expansion into Asia using the same playbook.




